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Recently, bioethicists and the UNCRPD have advocated for supported medical decision-making on behalf of patients 
with intellectual disabilities. But what does supported decision-making really entail? One compelling framework is 
Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis’ mental prosthesis account, which envisions supported decision-making as a process 
in which trustees act as mere appendages for the patient’s will; the trustee provides the cognitive tools the patient 
requires to realize her conception of her own good. We argue that supported decision-making would be better 
understood as a collaborative process, giving patients with intellectual disabilities the opportunity to make decisions 
in a respectful relationship with trusted others. We offer an alternative account of supported decision-making where 
the primary constraint is to protect the patient from domination by the trustee. This is advantageous in its preservation 
of the prospects for genuine collaboration, for the mental prosthesis approach ultimately reinforces a problematic ideal 
of isolated patient self-determination. 
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Introduction 
Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis have long argued that a liberal society should be inclusive 
not only in regard to people’s unconventional values or views, but also in regards to the 
unconventional “cognitive processes whereby these conceptions are formulated and maintained.” 
(Silvers and Francis 2009, 476) They paint a picture of what this radical inclusion would look like: 
while we should respect the evaluative perspectives of those people who can be characterized as 
“cerebral” and who actively engage in formulating, revising, and expressing their conception of 
the good, we must also respect those persons who “are so unable to express themselves in any way 
that we cannot be sure whether their behavior is mediated by concepts at all.” (Silvers and Francis 
2009, 476) This paper, in accordance with Silvers and Francis, starts from the assumption that 
people with intellectual and developmental disabilities, including those who are not verbally 
communicative, are owed respect as persons and asks how should decisions be made on their 
behalf. 
  
Consider the following case of a mother, Kristina Chew, who talks about the difficulties 
she faces when tasked with the work of representing her son, Charlie, who is autistic and minimally 
verbal: 
The quandary in representing Charlie is that he, the one being represented, is, all too often, 
limited in his ability to speak back and up about himself. I write about my son knowing 
that I may be very wrong about what he experiences, that it may be a very long time before 
he uses language to tell me and that indeed that may never happen…the communications 
of “nonverbal” or “minimally verbal” autistic people—including Charlie— are routinely 
perceived as so difficult to decode that they verge on the untranslatable and unknowable. 
This perception invites us to displace autistic voices with our own.(Chew 2013, 305-6) 
 
Three features are important to highlight about the way that Chew describes her predicament:  
[1] There is always going to be a chance that Chew misunderstands Charlie’s evaluative 
perspective or even whether he intends to communicate his evaluative perspective about a 
certain matter in a given instance with certain gestures or utterances.  
[2] It is unclear whether Charlie chooses to or can offer her feedback on the ways in which 
she is interpreting and representing his evaluative perspective. 
[3] The danger that Chew worries most about is that this communicative crevasse tempts 
her to supplant Charlie’s evaluative perspective with her own.  
Given these difficulties and the danger of obscuring the evaluative perspective of people like 
Charlie, how should we engage in decision-making that is radically inclusive of all of us, including 
those members of the human community who have intellectual disabilities? 
There seem to be three options for decision-making regarding persons with profound 
intellectual and developmental disabilities. We could maintain that medical decisions on behalf of 
intellectual and developmental disabilities (hereafter referred to as ‘IDD’) patients should always 
be independently controlled by the patients themselves. This means that the patient retains 
unconditional authority to make their own medical decisions, including the decision to solicit the 
support or advice from third parties as they see fit. While this is an important live option for many 
IDD patients, it is unclear how such a deliberative process would be feasible for a person like 
Charlie who has minimal communicative capacities. As Chew makes clear, all interactions with 
Charlie, at least at his current developmental state, require some interpretive work and 
representation on the part of his interlocutors.  
Second, we could institute a policy of substituted judgment. On this option, the trustee 
imagines what the patient would have chosen with access to full information and the ability to 
process it. Any relevant direct information for the substituted judgment standard is that which may 
have been expressed by the patient at a prior time of decision-making capacity. 1 If no such 
information is available, this is not seen as an impediment to the deployment of the substituted 
judgment standard. In fact, the substituted judgment standard often is “speculative and 
reconstructive”, to use Buchanan and Brock’s language (Buchanan and Brock 1990, 119). 
Consequently, substituted judgment does not require—and often actively discourages—the 
solicitation on the part of the trustee for any actual patient input at the time of decision-making, it 
is enough for the trustee to decide on the basis of this hypothetical evaluative perspective of the 
patient were they to be fully informed. It is unclear how this method would respect Charlie as a 
person: why think his current preferences and values would match the preferences and values of a 
person with full information or with wholly different set of cognitive capacities? (Howard and 
Wendler 2020) 
Finally, we can delineate a process of supported decision-making which envisions a 
collaboration between the patient and the trustee, but which gives the patient some sort of central 
authoritative role in the deliberation. Supported decision-making, at its heart requires two people 
 
1 It should be noted that trustees for patients who have previously been capable of medical decision-making (where 
the substituted judgment standard is most frequently invoked) are often instructed to disregard the input of a 
currently incapable patient, in favor of the trustee’s imaginative reconstruction of the patient’s evaluative 
perspective and the way the current decision at hand might fit in with this perspective.  
communicating together to reach a single decision. This can be contrasted with the single decision-
maker envisioned by either the independent control model or the substituted judgment model. On 
both of the first two models, there is a single decision-maker that is subject to certain constraints 
on their authority. For the independent control model, the patient retains decisional authority as 
long as they meet a certain threshold of cognitive capacity; if they fall below the threshold, they 
lose the authoritative standing of a person’s whose values should be respected and come to be 
understood solely in their role as a patient with interests to be safeguarded. For the substituted 
judgment model, on the other hand, the authoritative standing of the trustee is determined by their 
good faith effort to approximate the patient’s hypothetical independent evaluative perspective.  
So on neither the independent control or the substituted judgment model is any actual 
interpersonal co-deliberation required for decision-making: either the patients themselves or their 
surrogate decision-makers have sole authority to make a decision. This is not the case with 
supported decision-making which constitutively requires actual exchange -- or at least the 
opportunity to do so -- between interlocutors.  
Because of this distinction, supported decision-making has gained traction as the best 
model for medical decision-making for IDD patients who are designated as decisionally 
incapacitated. We agree that supported decision-making is the most promising path forward, but 
it is not one without its own share of challenges. Given the communicative barriers and the second-
guessing that is pervasive in trustee-patient relations, how are we supposed to evaluate whether 
the supported decision-making has succeeded and whether the patient has been afforded the respect 
they are due?  This paper suggests that what matters in a process of supported decision-making for 
IDD patients is that the patient’s perspective on the good is afforded the same moral significance 
as the perspective of a patient who is capable of unsupported decision-making. We will argue that 
for both supported and unsupported decision-making, patients are respected when they are not 
dominated by another in their decision-making. 
Unacceptable Decision-Making for IDD Patients 
In considering how medical decisions ought to be made on behalf of IDD patients, it may 
be helpful to examine a case that illustrates, from our perspective, an unacceptable approach to 
medical decision-making for this patient population. In Doe ex rel. Tarlow v. District of Columbia 
(489 F.3d 376 (D.C. Cir. 2007)), the majority opinion (authored by then-Circuit Judge Brett 
Kavanaugh) states that in cases of IDD patients, decisions ought to be made on the basis of “a 
good faith belief as to the best interests of the patient”, not “the known wishes standard” (Doe). 
Because these are patients who never have had the capacities required by law to engage in 
unsupported decision-making, “their true wishes with respect to a recommended surgery ‘are 
unknown and cannot be ascertained’...” (Doe). That the plaintiffs in fact possessed and articulated 
clear wishes with respect to a recommended surgery was purportedly irrelevant to how decisions 
regarding their treatment should be made.  
Doe reflects a specific way in which IDD patients are subject to disrespect in medical 
decision-making. Per Doe, because these patients lack, and have always lacked, certain capacities 
that are deemed necessary for making decisions by way of a purely rational process, it is impossible 
for these patients to have values or preferences or commitments that could be relevant to medical 
decision-making. The exact kinds of considerations that possess significant authority in decision-
making for currently competent or “once-competent” are devoid of any weight in decision-making 
for “never-competent” patients. All decisions, according to Doe, should be made on the basis of 
the best possible outside judgment of what is in the patient’s best interests. Consequently, not only 
is there no obligation for those tasked with making decisions on behalf of IDD patients to take 
their stated wishes and preferences into account; decision-makers, in many cases, should actively 
disregard patients’ stated wishes and preferences, as they may lead to distorted, incorrect, or even 
harmful decisions for the patient. 
In the clarity of its illustration of how IDD patients are denied recognition of their agential 
capacities, Doe helps us understand how medical decision-making for this patient population ought 
to be approached. Even if IDD patients may lack certain capacities (or fail to possess them to some 
specific degree) deemed necessary to make authoritative decisions without assistance, this should 
have no bearing on whether their actual wishes inform medical decisions. An approach to medical 
decision-making that treats the actual wishes of IDD patients as irrelevant, or even a potential 
hindrance, fails to give moral weight to these patients’ evaluative perspective and is thus 
disrespectful (Howard and Wendler 2020).  
Supported decision-making is particularly promising, then, because of the pride of place it 
gives to the actually elicited perspective of the patient.2 The approach is a direct response to the 
unique form of disrespect towards patients exemplified in Doe and endemic to current practices of 
medical decision-making. By treating as non-negotiable the relevance of the patient’s perspective 
to the decision and committing to recognition of the patient as the source of the decision, supported 
decision-making centers the patient as an agent in medical decisions - even if that agency requires 
support to be enacted. In articulating the nature of the collaboration constitutive of supported 
decision-making, we propose that this is the paramount ethical concern.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
A Non-Domination Approach to Supported Decision-Making 
 
2 Our discussion is applicable primarily to those IDD patients who are able to engage in kinds of activity that give 
clear indication of an evaluative perspective. Precisely what forms of activity can provide the basis for judgments 
about a patient’s evaluative perspective is an important question that any practicable account of supported decision-
making will need to address. But it is crucial, from our perspective, that we not assume that the kinds of activity able 
to form the basis of appropriate judgments about the patient’s evaluative perspective are those the majority of people 
will comfortably recognize as communicative activity. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for pressing us to 
clarify this. 
In the literature on medical decision-making for patients deemed capable of unassisted, 
authoritative decision-making, it is common to discuss the patient’s values as a constraint on and 
a guide for medical decisions. But ‘values’ often picks out a set of attitudes that are quite 
cognitively sophisticated; they are something like “considered judgments” or “second-order 
desires” or “reflectively endorsed preferences”. The emphasis on these cognitively sophisticated 
attitudes is understandable, given that talk of ‘values’ generally accompanies talk of respect for 
patient autonomy, itself a highly intellectualized notion.  
Yet there are many deep and stable attitudes towards persons, relationships, activities, 
objects, and pursuits that do not meet this cognitively sophisticated standard. Most IDD patients 
have loving and close relationships with family members and friends.3 They develop deep interests 
and passions for certain activities over others, and they will engage in patterns of behavior that 
reflect their interest and passion for the activity. They may have prolonged experience with 
particular forms of work or play that they develop a deep dislike for or aversion to. They may have 
abstract goals that they work towards achieving (such as independent living, social justice, or 
employment). These attitudes, while not always subject to explicit critical appraisal or reflective 
endorsement, form a way of seeing and navigating the world that is stable and distinctive. It is this 
orientation towards the world that we call an evaluative perspective.  
Importantly, evaluative perspectives are not simply attenuated or diminished forms of 
values, although values can be part of the distinctive evaluative perspective for many people. 
‘Evaluative perspective’ picks out a broader constellation of attitudes and habits of attention, ones 
 
3 We should note that the point here is not that love, care, and familial relations must form the basis of the 
trustee/patient relationship—although they may and frequently do. Rather, we point to the loving and close 
relationships that IDD patients enjoy with family and friends as material germane to discerning the patient’s 
evaluative perspective, even if the patient lacks the abilities traditionally thought necessary for the articulation and 
application of that evaluative perspective in a decision-making context. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing this out. 
that individuals with full use of their cognitive capacities also have. Thus treating a patient’s 
evaluative perspective as the object of moral concern is far more inclusive in which patients are 
counted as persons whose agency must be respected than traditional accounts. 
To ensure that patients’ actually elicited perspectives ground the collaboration central to 
supported decision-making, we propose that supported decision-making must be constrained by a 
commitment to non-domination. Non-domination is fundamentally concerned with ensuring that 
people are not vulnerable to outside interference that is divorced from their own evaluative 
perspectives (Pettit 1997; Pettit 2012). Domination occurs when a person is subject to the 
possibility that decisions or actions, over which they have (at least some) rightful say, will be 
redirected or frustrated by others unresponsive to that person’s concerns, feelings, and values. 
However, unlike the independent control model, non-domination is less concerned with ensuring 
that people are free from interference simpliciter (Pettit 1997). Imposing constraints on a decision-
making process in accord with considerations of non-domination does not necessarily require the 
minimization of involvement or “interference” from others.  
A non-dominating supported decision-making process will focus on ensuring that the 
trustee lacks the power to commit the patient to decisions or actions in the absence of the right 
kind of relation to the patient’s evaluative perspective. While it is important that the non-
domination approach be compatible with ensuring that the decision is authentic to the patient, the 
importance of ensuring authenticity need not be justified on grounds of non-domination. On the 
non-domination model of supported decision-making, the goal is to reach a decision endorsed by 
the patient.  
 We submit that a decision is endorsed by the patient if it satisfies the following conditions: 
[1]  The decision can be publicly justified in terms of the patient’s evaluative perspective; 
[2]  The patient has been given opportunity to contest both the decision and the trustee’s 
authority to engage in supported decision-making with patient; 
[3]  The patient cannot be interpreted as contesting 
There are two further conditions, that are not required by endorsement per se, but do need to be in 
place for the deliberative process to secure the patient’s capacity to endorse the decision at any 
given time: 
[4] There are periodic opportunities for the patient to affirm that the trustee is an 
appropriate decision-maker. 
[5]  The patient’s refusal to have a particular trustee serve as a decision-maker does not 
require justification on the patient’s part.  
The conditions for endorsement may seem fairly modest, as they focus primarily on the absence 
of contestation from the patient. However, this account of endorsement places significant 
constraints upon the decision-making process in order to create the conditions for its possibility. 
For it is imperative that the prospect of endorsement by the patient be guaranteed. A non-
dominating process strives not only to realize the goal of endorsement; it also strives to disallow 
the possibility that the process results in a decision not endorsed by the patient. Thus it is important 
to unpack in greater depth how considerations of non-domination constrain the decision-making 
process itself. 
First, the non-domination approach requires that the patient’s evaluative perspective be 
part of the foundation of the resulting decision. It is not enough that the decision merely not 
contradict the patient’s evaluative perspective, or that the patient’s evaluative perspective be the 
deciding factor in determining among decisions deemed appropriate without reference to the 
patient’s evaluative perspective. Rather, the patient’s evaluative perspective is part of the starting 
point for deliberation; it alone is capable of ruling out otherwise advisable or permissible courses 
of action.  This requires that significant time and attention be dedicated to eliciting the patient’s 
actual evaluative perspective; clarifying the patient’s specific attitudes towards potential courses 
of action and how they relate to the group’s current understanding of the patient’s evaluative 
perspective might also be necessary.  
Moreover, securing a foundational role for the patient’s evaluative perspective requires that 
the trustee be able to defend any course of action in terms of considerations grounded in the 
patient’s evaluative perspective. As Chew notes, “bad translations occur when the needs--the mode 
of signification--of the audience “blacks out” the original intent” (314). It is the responsibility of 
the trustee to ensure that the reasoning behind a decision is intelligible to others, but not in ways 
that undermine the decision’s resonance with the patient themselves.  
Second, the non-domination model emphasizes the importance of publicity within the 
collaboration. It is not enough that the trustee be able, if called upon, to justify the resulting 
decision in terms of the patient’s evaluative perspective. Non-domination requires that patients 
actually have the opportunity to contest and to continue the process of deliberation. This implies 
that trustees must actually publicly defend the decision in considerations grounded in the patient’s 
evaluative perspective. And just as the patient’s evaluative perspective must be directly elicited, 
so too must the patient’s possible contestation.  
The emphasis on publicity is also reflected in the role for other participants in decision-
making. Third parties (such as the medical provider, patient advocate, or a social worker) play an 
indispensable role in supported decision-making as safeguards for the patient against the 
possibility of being subject to decisions or actions divorced from the patient’s evaluative 
perspective. Eliciting the patient’s evaluative perspective is important in part because it gives third 
parties an opportunity to form their own judgments about the patient’s evaluative perspective, even 
if there remains a pro tanto obligation to defer to the trustee’s interpretation in cases of intractable 
disagreement between the trustee and a third party. Perceived discrepancy between the trustee’s 
justification regarding a decision and the patient’s elicited evaluative perspective should be 
challenged, and contestation by the patient should be prima facie supported by third parties. On 
the non-domination model, then, third parties can serve as an external check on the trustee’s power, 
the process does not rely on the explicit contestation of the patient. 
Finally, a non-domination approach to supported decision-making requires that the patient 
be given periodic opportunity to affirm that the trustee is the right decision-maker for the patient. 
Supported decision-making is not merely a series of disconnected instances of medical decisions, 
but a process that occurs against the background of a relationship between the patient and trustee. 
This background relationship is key to successful interpretation of the patient’s evaluative 
perspective, but it also can create situations in which the trustee is unquestionably deferred to in 
their interpretation of the patient’s evaluative perspective, regardless of whether they in fact are 
succeeding in their role as supporter. Moreover, this relationship may suffer from breakdowns in 
trust and comfort in ways that third parties are not privy to and cannot become privy to. Providing 
patients the opportunity periodically to affirm a specific individual as their trustee is essential to 
ensuring that the patient’s evaluative perspective remains foundational to supported decision-
making. 
In addition to affording IDD patients periodic opportunity to affirm an individual as trustee, 
a non-domination approach to supported decision-making requires that any refusal of an individual 
as the patient’s trustee must not require that the patient justify this refusal. Neurotypical patients 
need not provide clear reason for disqualifying specific individuals as decision-makers in the event 
that the patient becomes unable to serve as their own decision-maker. Given the increased risk of 
the evaluative perspective of IDD patients being disregarded or downplayed, it is all the more 
important that IDD patients not be required to justify their refusal to have a specific person serve 
as the patient’s trustee. The commitment to treating the patient’s evaluative perspective as 
foundational extends not just to the medical decision itself, but also to decisions about who 
supports the patient in decision-making.  
A non-domination approach to supported decision-making emphasizes the creation of 
conditions for a decision-making process that hews closely to the patient’s evaluative perspective. 
But it opens up the possibility for a fundamentally more shared form of medical decision-making, 
one which does not envision supported decision-making as an approximation of individual 
decision-making. But perhaps, in taking the ‘shared’ aspect of this sort of supported decision-
making, it does not go far enough to ensure that IDD patients' rights are respected. In the remainder 
of this paper, we defend our approach to supported decision-making against a more aspirationally 
individualistic approach to supported decision-making - the mental prosthesis model. 
Why Not Mental Prosthesis?  
Silvers and Francis’ advocacy for radical inclusion has led them to defend an approach to 
supported decision-making which aspires to the idea of mental prosthesis: “In the collaboration 
we envision, the trustee does not step into the subject’s role in shaping a personalized notion of 
the good. Instead, as a prosthetic arm or leg executes some of the functions of a missing fleshly 
one without being confused with or supplanting the usual fleshly limb so, we propose, a trustee’s 
reasoning and communicating can execute part or all of a subject’s own thinking process without 
substituting the trustees own idea as if it were the subject’s own.” (Silvers and Francis, 2009, 485) 
This approach is one way to attempt to ensure that trustees like Chew are not displacing her son’s 
voice with her own. Insofar as she sees herself as solely an appendage of her son’s independent 
deliberation, she is not tempted to let her own evaluative perspective slip into her decision-making  
Like our non-domination approach, the mental prosthesis approach of supported decision-
making, requires the trustee to be primarily attuned to the evaluative perspective of the subject. 
However, their approach differs from ours in three key ways: 
[1]  The aim of supported decision-making on the mental prosthesis approach is to simulate 
individual decision-making, whereas the aim of the non-domination approach is to engage 
shared decision-making that is non-dominating of the patient’s evaluative perspective. 
[2] On the mental prosthesis approach, the trustee is instructed to aim at their own 
evaluative transparency rather than to be constrained by non-domination. 
[3]  On the mental prosthesis approach, the subject’s perspective is understood as the “sole 
inspiration” for deliberation. 
Let us look more closely at each of these three differences.  
Simulating Individual Decision-Making 
First, on Silvers and Francis’ views, the goal of supported decision-making is to 
supplement the subject’s mental capacities so as to approximate as close as possible to the 
individual decision-making process that the subject would have done if they did not require 
deliberative support. Silvers and Francis write that we must be careful to “distinguish between a 
process that remains a simulation of a particular human capacity that the subject lacks and a 
prosthetic process that compensates with a different capacity.” (486) 
Silvers and Francis use the example of competitive running and prosthetic racing feet to 
illustrate this difference. They defend the International Association of Athletics Federations ban 
on sprinters relying on assistive devices that roll on wheels because the point of a sprinting 
competition is to test a person’s individual running abilities; it is not, more broadly, designed to 
test athlete’s quickness in mobility from one location to another. Insofar as a person is competing 
in a sprinting competition, there will be appropriate limitations on the shape and function of the 
prosthetic mechanisms that a runner can use. Similarly, they argue, when it comes to supported 
decision-making, there should be appropriate limitations on the shape and function of the mental 
prosthesis that should be made available to the deliberating subject.  
In contrast, our non-domination approach does not limit the deliberative supports that a 
trustee can offer solely to those processes that would simulate individual decision-making. We see 
three disanalogies between thinking about appropriate limits for prosthetic supports to sprinters 
and appropriate limits of deliberative supports for IDD patients.  
First the criteria for appropriate prosthetic support for sprinting is based on one’s notion of 
‘fair competition’ but there is no reason to think that fair competition matters when it comes to 
supported decision-making. The reason why wheels are not deemed appropriate assistive 
technology is not that they do not allow people who use them to quickly get from one place to 
another, but rather the mode of movement on wheels is sufficiently different from running that it 
would not make sense to include athletes on wheels as engaged in the same competitive endeavor 
as runners -either on fleshly or on prosthetic feet. On the other hand, the choices made regarding 
health care or research participation do not close off opportunities for others in the same way. 
When it comes to exercising one’s deliberative activities – such as voting or making medical 
decision-making – the standard of what counts as an appropriate deliberative support need not be 
sensitive to how closely the functioning mimics the functioning of such a role without the assistive 
technology.  If a person who requires assistive technologies can make a better decision about how 
to vote (i.e. one that better reflects their evaluative perspective) with the aid of assistive thinking 
than one can without such aids, there is nothing yet unfair about participation with the use of these 
‘enhanced functions.’ When it comes to supported decision-making, there is no zero sum game 
that may give certain people an unfair competitive edge.  
The challenge for what counts as an “appropriate support” verses one of “trustee overstep” 
is not necessarily best determined by the level with which the deliberative process closely mimics 
individual decision-making.  Which leads to the second disanalogy that we find: sprinting is judged 
on individual merit but deliberation [insofar as it is evaluated as successful or not] is often 
collaborative. Indeed Silvers and Francis, share this view of the collaborative nature of deliberation 
in general: “For all of us and not just for cognitively disabled people, conceptions of the good are 
socially scripted and interactively developed.” (485) Why strip this collaborative aim for people 
with minimal verbal communication when it is appropriate for others? Rather than aim for 
simulating individual deliberation, we think that a more appropriate aim should be simulating 
shared decision-making that is non-dominating.  
The final disanalogy is in thinking about a competitive sprinter’s use of assistive 
technologies, we may be mislead to focus primarily on a ‘lacked’ capacity that is simulated rather 
than on supporting and amplifying present capacities. Insofar as the trustee is charged with limiting 
their interaction with the patient to only supplementing the capacities that the patient is lacking, 
the trustee must constantly be paying acute attention to what is lacking, rather than to engage in 
conversation and deliberation with the patient to ensure that their evaluative perspective is clarified 
and amplified - whatever means that perspective is communicated. 
Taking these three disanalogies together, the point of mental prosthesis should not be 
limited in relation to whether it gives a person an advantage in their decision-making over others 
– at least not when it comes to how these assistive practices are going to be incorporated in medical 
decision-making. Second, thinking and deliberating is already a social endeavor. Why should 
supported decision-making prohibit the subject from engaging with a trustee that allows the 
process to amplify the social feature of the deliberative process rather than the independent control 
of the deliberative process? Given these disanalogies, we need not be limited to prosthetic 
mentality on the same model as prosthetic running blades. If the aim of supported decision-making 
is to ensure that the process respects and grows out of the evaluative perspective of the subject, 
mental prosthesis is one way to achieve such an aim, but it is not the only way and it may not be 
the most appropriate way in certain contexts or with certain persons. 
The Requirements of the Transparent Self 
Not only do Silvers and Francis envision a process that is completely controlled by the 
patient, they also envision the personality and evaluative perspective of the trustee to be diminished 
in their deliberative role: 
The conceptualization should be stripped of the personality of the trustee. A fit trustee also will be 
someone whose identity is not invested in executing the trustee role, so as to be able to abstract 
himself from the process and the product. (Silvers and Francis 2009, 493) 
 
But as we saw above, when thinking about the appropriate trustee relationship, we need not limit 
ourselves to the functionally similar deliberative procedure of a running blade when we have other 
models that can guide us. The running blade is a top-down form of control through prosthesis. It 
is the runner and the runner alone who controls what the prosthetic feet do. But there are other 
models of mentality and its relation to action that are more collaborative.  
Consider for instance the way that an octopus explores and acts in its environment. Early 
on, biologists thought that the arms seemed “curiously divorced” from the brain, but recently 
studies have found much more coordination between the central brain and its arms (Smith 2016, 
68). While the octopuses’ brain retains a centralized authority, delegating and coordinating the 
movement of its limbs, the limbs still have leeway to explore the environment and report back  
findings. On this model, the octopuses’ actions are still attributable to the individual animal, even 
if the intentionality is less centralized. Similarly, when it comes to supported decision-making, it 
may be fruitful to think about the possibilities of a more collaborative and coordinated model that 
the octopus makes vivid: allowing the arms to explore and employ some discretion in order to best 
attain the organism’s overall goal.  
Given the social nature of much deliberation, rather than think of oneself as an inanimate 
blade, guided solely by the intentional choices of the subject, a trustee may better understand their 
role as an exploratory or improvisorial arm, with some independent imaginative and discretionary 
powers, but always coordinated under the guiding authority of the subject.  
This possibility is in line with the responsibilities attributed to trustees as Silvers and 
Francis envision them. They argue that trustees “must do more than weigh practicalities”- that is 
execute a plan of how to achieve the subject’s conception of the good - “[t]hey must also transfer 
allegiances from conceptualizations that come to appear as chimerical to ones ready to be realized. 
Trustees charged with assisting people with cognitive disabilities in perfecting ideas of the good 
for them should be especially energetic in presenting and exploring alternatives through a 
revisionary process. Simply rejecting an idea does not do the job.” (491) We agree with these 
robust requirements of the trustee. Being the trustee requires discretion, resourcefulness and the 
use of one’s own imaginative capacities and judgments. For this reason, instructing the trustee to 
aim at becoming transparent and to not be invested in their role as trustee, may constrain a more 
proactive orientation to the shared deliberation.  
One of the agential capacities that people have is to trust specific others to support them in 
their decision-making. When we trust others, we are not merely relying on their abstract cognitive 
capacities. We often trust their judgment, which may be hard won given their distinctive 
experiences and histories, and we often trust that they care about us and are invested in our life 
projects and commitments. It is unclear whether all IDD patients would want their trustees to 
abstract away from all the features that distinctively make them trustworthy to the patient in the 
first place. The patient’s evaluative perspective need not be limited to the outcomes of the decision; 
patients may also have views and preferences about the shared decision-making process itself. 
While some patients may prefer an abstracted trustee, others may wish to have the support and 
collaboration of a friend or loved one, with deep personal investment in the relationship. Our non-
domination approach does not weigh in on which of these wishes is better. What matters is that 
surrogates approach their role in a manner endorsed by the patients. This opens up different styles 
of shared decision-making between patient and trustee, depending on the expressed evaluative 
perspective of the patient and the judgments of the trustee about how to best inhabit their 
supportive role. 
The Patient as the Sole Inspiration 
We agree that the patient perspective should have an authoritative and active role to play 
in deliberation, but we are not sure that this requires that the patient’s perspective be the sole 
inspiration for the deliberative process for many of the reasons we have already articulated. The 
mental prosthesis approach differs from the non-domination approach in its view of the purpose 
of collaboration. While the mental prosthesis approach envisions the patient and trustee working 
together to simulate an individual reasoning and decision-making process, the non-domination 
approach envisions the patient and trustee functioning as independent parts of a shared reasoning 
and decision-making process, one constrained by the patient’s evaluative perspective.  
In view of this, one might wonder whether what we are articulating in this paper is a 
genuine alternative account of supported decision-making to the mental prosthesis model, or rather 
another approach intended for a different patient population. Specifically, perhaps we should see 
the non-domination model as an approach to supported decision-making suitable for those patients 
who require greater support in their decision-making due to the dormancy or absence of capacities 
assumed necessary to independently articulate an evaluative perspective that can establish the 
foundation for decision-making. In contrast, the mental prosthesis approach may be thought to be 
better suited for IDD patients able to independently advocate for and articulate their own evaluative 
perspective.4   
We think our model is genuinely an alternative approach for all IDD patients. All IDD 
patients, including those with who can independently advocate for their own evaluative 
perspective, may prefer a more proactive partner in the trustee. We believe that the social and 
collaborative nature afforded by the non-domination model is appropriate quite broadly. But we 
do concede that the differences between the two models pose a potential problem for the non-
domination model. They highlight that the non-domination model places less emphasis on the 
significance of independence of the patient in the decision-making process.  
Given the aims of supported decision-making to secure respect for patients who historically 
have been deprived of control over their medical decisions, one may argue that a non-domination 
approach does not go far enough in actually supporting the patient and her distinctive evaluative 
perspective. One might object that the non-domination approach does not articulate a form of 
supported decision-making at all. Specifically, one might object that the non-domination approach 
is not meaningfully different from a substituted judgment approach to decision-making. If this 
were so, then we would run the risk of articulating a form of supported decision-making that only 
 
4 Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this way of thinking about the relationship between the non-
domination model and the mental prosthesis model and encouraging us to be clearer about why we do not view 
ourselves as merely articulating a separate approach to supported decision-making for a different patient population. 
superficially protected the evaluative perspectives of IDD patients—especially those patients who 
may be unable to communicate on their own behalf in ways that are recognized by the majority of 
individuals. We recognize this as an important challenge to our view. In the final section of the 
paper, we will articulate some reasons why we think that the non-domination model is importantly 
different from substituted judgment. 
Is the Patient Supported Enough? 
The non-domination approach anticipates that the trustee will be responsible for 
articulating the patient’s evaluative perspective, but also that the trustee will engage in some 
independent forms of deliberative activity. Given the independence of the trustee as a deliberative 
participant, one might worry that non-domination hews far closer to substituted judgment than to 
the vision of supported decision-making. 
However, this objection overlooks some key distinctions.  First, the substituted judgment 
approach allows the trustee to merely imagine the patient’s evaluative perspective. While 
substituted judgment presumes the trustee has some general knowledge of the patient’s evaluative 
perspective, the idea behind substituted judgment is that the trustee uses this knowledge to develop 
a picture of how the patient’s evaluative perspective, appropriately informed and idealized, would 
extend to the particular decision-making context. But there is no requirement, or even expectation, 
that the patient’s actual perspective on this decision will factor into deliberation. By contrast, the 
non-domination approach requires that the trustee and other participants directly and publicly elicit 
the patient’s evaluative perspective. Moreover, this actually elicited evaluative perspective is 
indispensable to the decision-making process. Thus the non-domination approach insists that 
deliberation be responsive to the actual patient, not to an imagined form of the patient. 
 Second, trustees on the substituted judgment approach assume decision-making authority 
for the patient. This decision-making authority is awarded to the trustee on an assumption that they 
have specific insight into the patient’s evaluative perspective, insight that can guide decision-
making on behalf of the patient. Thus there is no expectation, on the substituted judgment model, 
that the trustee offer a public justification of their interpretation of the patient’s evaluative 
perspective. It is simply assumed that the trustee’s interpretation of the patient’s evaluative 
perspective is authoritative. This differs from the non-domination approach, in which the trustee 
is not authoritative with respect to the patient’s evaluative perspective. The trustee has a 
responsibility to the patient and to the medical team to actually defend their interpretation of the 
patient’s evaluative perspective and the resulting decision. 
 Third, the substituted judgment approach is an individualistic approach to medical 
decision-making. The trustee is tasked with making decisions both constrained by the patient’s 
evaluative perspective and informed by the current clinical circumstances. Thus acquiring key 
clinical information will require the input of the health care provider. Moreover, the trustee may 
solicit advice or feedback from other parties should they feel it useful or helpful. But ultimately, 
these are decisions for the trustee to make. On the substituted judgment account, contestation from 
third parties of the decision is appropriate only if the trustee is operating outside the bounds of 
their authority, or if there is reason to reevaluate whether the individual is suitable to serve as 
trustee.  
 In contrast, the non-domination approach is fundamentally a collaborative approach to 
medical decision-making, constrained by the evaluative perspective of the patient. This 
commitment to collaboration necessitates the creation of opportunities for contestation; a 
collaboration that recognizes contestation only when third parties take it upon themselves to 
challenge the outcome of a deliberative process--and this challenge has been deemed an admissible 
challenge to the trustee’s authority--seems far from the spirit of collaborative decision-making. 
Thus the non-domination approach, unlike substituted judgment, does not award the trustee sole 
authority over the decision. 
 In sum, the non-domination approach, both in its commitment to ensuring that the trustee 
is responsive to the actually elicited evaluative perspective of the patient and its emphasis on the 
importance of public deliberation and opportunities for contestation, does not award the trustee the 
kind of power over decision-making that the substituted judgment approach allows for. Thus the 
non-domination approach, while giving the trustee greater leeway in deliberation and decision-
making than the mental prosthesis approach, protects the patient from having their evaluative 
perspective overlooked or overridden in a way that the substituted judgment approach does not.  
 The outlined approach above raises a number of practical challenges that must be 
thoughtfully addressed, ranging from concerns about identifying those communicative techniques 
that accurately elicit the patient’s evaluative perspective to worries about the degree of 
burdensomeness for the trustee, which may incentivize hasty or unjustified judgments about the 
patient’s evaluative perspective.5 While it goes beyond the scope of this paper to address these 
challenges—challenges that confront not just any proponent of supported decision-making, but 
that regularly crop up in thinking about medical decision-making on behalf of neurotypical 
patients6—we recognize the need to tackle these questions in thinking about supported decision-
 
5 Thank you to two anonymous reviewers for raising these as reasonable concerns about the prospect of achieving 
the outlined approach in the paper. 
6 It is not uncommon in the clinical context, for example, for there to be regular and extensive goals of care 
conversations with surrogate decision-makers where there is disagreement between the team and the family about 
the appropriate course of action. And it is not uncommon for clinical ethicists to advise in such circumstances that 
medical professionals attend to the potential burdensomeness of such repeated conversations and to recommend 
strategies for mitigating those burdens and optimizing conversations with families.  
making in order to ensure that we have not outlined a process that potentially undercuts the extent 
to which the patient’s evaluative perspective guides decision-making. 
 But one might object to the degree of leeway that has been afforded to the trustee in even 
the conceptual formation of our approach to supported decision-making. The aim of supported 
decision-making is to facilitate authentic decisions for patients who may only ever be spoken on 
behalf of. By allowing greater room for the trustee’s own perspective, it may be argued that the 
non-domination approach undermines the very intent of supported decision-making. Therefore, 
the individualism at the heart of the mental prosthesis approach is a desirable feature; it affords the 
patient’s evaluative perspective the respect it deserves. 
 We grant that our approach allows for the trustee’s evaluative perspective to have greater 
potential influence over the resulting decision. But we are comfortable with this outcome. We 
believe that  the non-domination approach is closer to the way most people actually make and 
actually prefer to make decisions. And this includes patients who have no need for supported 
decision-making. While it is common to articulate an ideal of independent medical decision-
making for patients in full use of their cognitive capacities, it is far more common for patients to 
base their decisions on the recommendations and perspectives of others involved in the 
deliberation (Ubel, Scherr, and Fagerlin 2017). This may include family members, friends, health 
care providers, or even strangers on internet forums. As is well noted by advocates of supported 
decision-making, most people--regardless of the presence or absence of an intellectual or 
developmental disability--want to be supported in making their medical decisions. There are 
perhaps some occasions, such as labor and delivery plans or the choice to undergo prophylactic 
double mastectomy surgery, where the ability to independently make medical decisions is of 
paramount importance since these decisions are necessary for our ability to lead our lives according 
to our values. But often, we make medical decisions just to get healthy or to alleviate pain. Medical 
decisions may not be expressions of our deep values, they are often just instrumental so that we 
can go on to make the truly meaningful life choices elsewhere. This doesn’t mean that patients 
should be subject to the domination of others while making such decisions, but aiming at maximal 
autonomy is only one way to safeguard against domination.  
 It may be pointed out that the non-domination approach still treats IDD patients, and the 
moral status of their evaluative perspective, differently, in that it articulates a different ideal of 
medical decision-making. Even if it is true that patients in full use of their cognitive capacities 
often make decisions in a more collaborative way, it is still open to them to make decisions 
informed only by their own evaluative perspective. Patients with full use of their cognitive 
capacities have the authority to exclude certain contributions or considerations, and to make 
medical decisions largely independently. The mental prosthesis approach, in its encouraged view 
of the trustee as a mere appendage of the patient, protects this authority. By contrast, the non-
domination approach does not award such authority to IDD patients; it only ensures the 
predominance of these patients’ evaluative perspectives in the resulting decisions. This is the 
relevant sense in which the non-domination approach may be understood as failing to afford the 
patient’s evaluative perspective due respect.  
 We recognize the noted asymmetry between the non-domination approach for supported 
decision-making and the autonomy-centered ideal common for patients in full use of their 
cognitive capacities. Perhaps maintaining this asymmetry would reflect an unacceptable difference 
in the respect we give to the evaluative perspectives of IDD patients. However, we think that this 
asymmetry should be resolved by reconsidering our ideal for patients in full use of their cognitive 
capacities. In other words, we are skeptical that this ideal of full independence is a more 
appropriate aim for patients than making decisions that reflect their values while being free from 
domination in the process. To defend this point goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, we 
reject the claim that we should resolve the asymmetry by defending an approach to supported 
decision-making that strives to approximate a wholly independent decision-making process. 
Rather, we think this should be cast as an invitation to reflect on whether the non-domination 
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